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The statute, therefore, is, obliging the court to .assume a task that courts
have traditionally refused to lundertitke:':.
It is suggested that an amendment to the statute will eliminate this
undesirable result. The legislature' could adopt a 'statute similar. ' the
arbitration statute of Illinois• which expressly provides for -retention of
equitable jurisdiction by the court in the enforcement of awards .° A less
drastic approach would be to exempt awards directing personal service
from the requirement of obligatory confirmation. Such amendments would
allow the courts to use discretion in cases similar to the main' case and
thereby avoid the problems that arise when a court is obliged to confirm
such awards. 1°
PAUL V. KENNEALLY
Conditional Sales—Rescission by Purchaser Allowed Where Contract
Did Not Preciiely Conform to Statutory Standard.—Bratta v: Caruso
Car co,'—:-The plaintiff pUrchased a car from the defendant pursuant to a
ConditiOnal salei' contract purporting to be executed under' the provisions , of
the California Civil Code,' § '2982. 2 The contraet 'recited a $300 'cash down
paynent.  In,
 reality, the plaintiff had insufficient funds to meet the down
payment and, a promissory note for the amount was then' executed in faiior
of the defendant. The defendant referred the plaintiff to a' finance company
where he could 'obtain a $300' loan and make the specified cash' down pay-
ment. The plaintiff upon learning of the terms required by the' finance
company 3 refused' to negotiate the loan. He, therenpon; gavenotice Of re-
scission to the defendant who refused to agree to a'rescission, and whd; there-
after, repossessed . the ca•upOn the pWntiff's failure to Inake-the specified
payments. In a suit by the plaintiff for rescission the Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, held for the' defendant. On the plaintiff's appeal the
District Court of Appeals, Second District of California; reversed, holding
that since the purchaser 'did not make a cash payment of $300 "in 'cash"
as recited in the contract, but executed a' note in such amount,. the condi-
tional sale contract was -invalid under the California Civil Code, § 2982,
and the purchaser was entitled to rescind.
The decision is in accord with recent California cases holding that the
statute was enacted for the benefit of purchasers for the reason that they
are not in : purl delicto with sellers, and, therefore; conditional sale con-
tracts which do not 'strictly conform with the statutory provisionS are unen-
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 10, 4 13 (1457).
19 See 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 961 for a comment on the main case.,
1 333 P.2d 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).' • '•
2 The California Civil Code, 2982, provides in effect that an exact copy' of every
conditional 'sales contract shall be delivered by the seller to the buyer at ' the time of
execution and that certain items such as cash price, down payment, balance 'dtie, etc.,
shall be recited in the contract; moreover, the statute provides the exact order in which
each item is to appear. ', • '
' 3 In addition to having a lien imposed on his hro rtsehold furniture, • the plaintiff
would have bad to make 19 'Monthly payments of $25 'each.. In other words, he - would
have had to pay $475 for the privilege-of borrowing $300. • - ••
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forceable by the seller. 4
 The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, :also, was
enacted with the intent to protect buyers from unscrupulous sellers', 5 how-
ever, the Act contains no comparable provisions requiring. that the condi-
tional sale contract contain .recitals of price, payment, and balance due in
a specified order, 'all of which is necessary under the California statute.
Sections 2 and 3 of the Uniform Conditional SaleS Act afford relief to either
a buyer or seller who is not in defaultyand the cases are numerous granting
such relief,6
 but no case has been found awarding relief to a party who
is himself in default—even though he be a purchaser. In contrast with the
California statute and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, the Uniform
Commercial Cade is more concerned, with the continued . expansion of com-
mercial dealings7 s than with any, overprotection of ,conditional sales vendee.s,
The Code also has no stringent ,requirements comparable to ,those of §, 2982,
of the:California Civil Code and requires only a financing statement signed
by the,parties containing their, addresses and a :description of the item of
collateral!' . ; :
The fact -that the California Courts regard the provisions of the Cali,
fornia. Civil,Code as mandatory seems to lead to rather harsh and inequitable
resulti; for example, a conditional+sales contract has been,held to, be unen,
forceable:by -the seller for failure. to deliver,a copy„thereof to the buyer at
the time of execution .9
 Any such statutory construction leads one to infer
that a contract would be unenforceable by the seller if any items . therein
appearing, are not in the sequence prescribed by' the statute." The instant
decision seems. to place the : seller ,in, a most undesirable position. A condi-
tional sales contract could conceivably be executed in full compliance with
the statute, and, in the, exigencies of the , particular situation, a shrewd
buyer could rescind merely, by showing that a particular item deviates from
the original agreement of ,the parties. For example, wliere. buyer and seller
execute a valid ;conditional sales contract,: and buyer, later claims inability
to fulfill a , particular provision, and seller agrees upon .
 some alternative.
If a new contract indicating ,the change is not executed, the seller has left
hirnself.vulnerabIe.to
 rescission. Such a result as this would not occur under
the,,Uniform Conditional Sales. Act where,,reasonable errors are not fatal
and relief is usually granted, according to equitable principles of substantive
4 Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P.2d' 758 (1949) ; Estrada v.
Alvarez, .38 Cal. 2d 386, .240 P.2d 278 (1952); Williams v. Cardo Enterprises, 140 Cal.
App. 2d"973; 295 P.2d 592 (Super. Ct. L.A. App. Div. 1956). ' • . • .
	
•	 .
, 5 Plainfield Motor Co. v. Salamon, • 12 N.J. Misc. 570, 180 Atl. 429 (D.C.N.J. 1935) ;
Street v. Commercial. Crecqt CO., 35 Ariz. 479, 281 Pat. 46 (1929).
Capitol Refrigerato'r , Co. v. • Schmidt - 121 N•J.L..'58I, 3 A.2d 603 (Err. & App.
1939) ;'•nch Equipment Corp: v: Lorenio, 23 N.J. Super. 63, 92 A.2d 480 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. ,1952). •• • ' ' • • •
7 UCC § 1-102(2)(6).
8 UCC § 9-402.	 ,
9 Williams v, Caruso Enterprises, supra note 4. See also note 2 supra.
19 California Civil Code, §2982, 'piovid6 in part that: "(a) ... It Shall . recite the
following separate items as such, in the following order . . ," [Ernphasis ;.Cldeci].
9 Capitol Refrigerator Co. v. Schmidt, supra note 6; Ench Equipment Corp. v.
Lorenzo, supra note 6:
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The Uniform Commercial Code draftsmen apparently were aware that
conditional sales statutes in many states were outmoded and that business
practices were changing so rapidly it seemed more desirable to draft
laws having the free flow of commercial transactions as an objective. The
Code provisions reducing formalities to a minimum' 2
 seems to be sound
practice, in that courts will be free to interpret and apply flexible rather
than rigid standards to conditional sales contracts.
BRUCE N. SACHAR
Constitutional Law—Export-Import Clause—State's Power to Tax
Exports—Sales Tax.—Cough Industries, Inc. v. State Board of Equal-
ization.'—The defendant, a California manufacturer of electrical supplies,
sold goods in California to a purchaser for direct export to Saudi Arabia.
Because the defendant could not meet the specified packaging requirements,
the agreement provided that the defendant should deliver the goods to •a
California export packer to be designated by the purchaser. When the
goods were ready for packaging, the defendant delivered them to the packer
who specially packed and crated them for shipment overseas. The packer
then delivered them to an ocean carrier for transportation to Saudi Arabia.
Pursuant to the sales contract title passed from the defendant to the pur-
chaser upon delivery of the goods to the packer. Under the California sales
tax statute, the state levied an assessment on the defendant as the seller of
these goods. The tax was paid under protest and proceedings were brought
to recover the payment. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cali-
fornia, held the tax to have been improperly assessed because the goods
were in foreign commerce immediately upon leaving the defendant's hands
and, therefore, constitutionally could not be taxed by California. The
District Court of Appeal, for the Third District reversed, 2 holding that
nothing had occurred prior to or at the time of assessment to take the
goods out of the general mass of property in the state and that they were
not in export until after the packer had completed his packaging pursuant
to the purchaser's orders and had turned them over to the motor carrier
for delivery to the ocean carrier. On appeal the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and reversed that of
the District Court of Appea1.3
The decision of the California Supreme Court seems at variance with
the authorities establishing the rule that goods do not cease to be part of
the general mass of property within the state subject to nondiscriminatory
state taxation until they have been shipped, or "entered" with a common
carrier for transportation to another state, or have been started upon such
transportation in a continuous route or journey.' This rule, although for-
12 UCC iii 9-110, 9-402.
1 51 Cal. 2d 746, 336 P.2d 161 (1959), cert. den. 359 U.S. 1011 (1959).
2 332 P.2d 378 (1958).
3 Note 1 supra,
4 Coe v. Eroll, 116 U.S. 517 (1886) ; Turpin v. Burges, 117 U.S. 504 (1886) ;
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